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International corporate finance has greatly expanded with the increased 
globalization and led to many new research topics.  In this dissertation, I examine two 
distinct international finance topics; (i) determinants of corporate tax inversion and the 
effects ex-post; and (ii) determinants of for-profit microfinance institutions and financial 
and social performance.  
In Chapter 1, I study corporate tax inversion which is a reorganization by which a 
domestic firm changes its tax-domicile from the United States to a foreign country with a 
lower corporate tax rate. In 2014 alone, U.S. public companies valued at over half a trillion 
dollars announced their intention to invert as part of a merger/acquisition deal (Babkin, 
Glover, and Levine, 2016).  The United States corporate tax rate of 35% (one of the highest 
in the world) is not the only incentive for corporations to move their legal domicile; the 
U.S. also taxes firms on their foreign and domestically-sourced income (Gunn and Lys, 
2016).  Avoiding these higher taxes through inversions and earnings stripping (shift income 
from its U.S. based subsidiaries to its new lower tax domicile) are legal practices and in 
line with the firm’s goal of maximizing the market value of shareholder equity.  Using 
hand collected data for the period 1983-2015, I find that 43 U.S. public firms from 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ, across 15 unique industries have completed a corporate 
inversion and moved their legal tax domicile to one of ten different countries with a lower 




freedom measures of the target countries, the market reaction of the inversion 
announcement and ex-post firm financials and taxes.  I find that large firms that are less 
profitable (measured by return on assets) are more likely to invert and the inversion target 
location is more likely to have greater tax freedom and investment freedom. The overall 
market reaction of the inversion announcement is positive and significant over a seven day 
(-3, +3) event window and this is driven by more recent inversions (post 2004) to non-tax 
haven countries (Canada, Australia, and European). Ex-post the inverted firms show no 
significant change in taxes compared to a matched sample when controlling for industry, 
size, sales, and profitability. 
In Chapter 2, I study the determinants of for-profit microfinance institutions and 
the financial and social performance.  Microfinance institutions (MFIs) provide small 
loans and other financial services to the poor and unbanked all over the world.  The 
microfinance industry started out as a non-profit business however we have seen growth 
of for-profit MFIs and commercial banks breaking into this sector which began debates 
about whether it is possible to effectively blend nonprofit ideals (social outreach) and for-
profit orientations and practices; i.e. financial performance and sustainability (Morduch, 
2000).  Literature argues that primary goal of the MFI is to reach the poorest sections of 
the population and the second goal is financial sustainability (Mersland and Strøm, 2008).  
The founder of Grameen banfiguk (the first microfinance institution) and winner of the 
Nobel Peace Prize, Muhammad Yunus, argues that MFIs that seek to maximize profits 
will do so at the cost of the poor and will trade off social performance for financial 
performance (Yunus, 2011).  Claims are also made that MFIs experience “mission drift” 




Strøm, 2010).  The goal of this paper is exploratory in nature and seeks to study the 
evolution of the international microfinance industry, specifically the differences in for-
profit and non-profit institutions.  Is there a place for profit seeking firms in the business 
of providing the poor access to loans and other financial services?  Can these firms 
sustainably operate while also fulfilling the mission for whom non-profit microfinance 
institutions were originally created?  Which types of firms are more successful, both 
financially and socially and what are the determinants of this success?  Do country 
specific formal institutions, cultural dimensions, and development play a role in the 
performance (financially and socially) and likelihood of MFIs being for-profit 
institutions?   
Using a large dataset of more than 2,400 individual microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) from 120 countries for the period of 1999-2016, I find that nearly half of the 
international MFIs operate as for-profit institutions.  For-profit MFIs tend to have more 
administrative expenses, pay higher salaries, are more profitable, have more staff turnover, 
and charge higher interest rates (on average). Non-profit MFIs tend to be busier, pay less 
tax, have larger boards, and have a larger percentage of the board and borrowers that are 
female.  The formal institutions within a country such as; business regulatory environment, 
property rights, social protection, and a developed financial sector, are significant 
determinants of for-profit MFIs.  Cultures with higher degrees of power distance, 
individualism, masculinity and indulgence (from Hofstede’s cultural dimensions) tend to 
have more for-profit MFIs.  Cultural dimensions and formal institutions at the country level 
tend to result in better financial and social performance for the microfinance institution. 
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CORPORATE TAX INVERSION: IS IT  





Corporate inversion, a reorganization by which a domestic firm changes its tax-
domicile from the United States to a foreign country with a lower corporate tax rate, has 
become more popular among U.S. firms despite the increase in regulations to make the 
“unpatriotic” deed more difficult to accomplish.  In 2014 alone, U.S. public companies 
valued at over half a trillion dollars announced their intention to invert as part of a 
merger/acquisition deal (Babkin, Glover, and Levine, 2016).  The United States corporate 
tax rate of 35% (one of the highest in the world) is not the only incentive for corporations 
to move their legal domicile; the U.S. also taxes firms on their foreign and domestically-
sourced income (Gunn and Lys, 2016).  Avoiding these higher taxes through inversions 
and earnings stripping (shift income from its U.S. based subsidiaries to its new lower tax 
domicile) are legal practices and in line with the firm’s goal of maximizing the market 
value of shareholder equity.   
This paper focuses on exploring several questions: what types of firms have 
completed corporate inversions and to which countries are they reincorporating? What are 
the financial and tax benefits of inverting, if any? Are taxes the only incentive to invert and 




firm’s target country inversion decisions?  What is the market reaction and ex-post are 
there any benefits to firms inverting? 
By hand collecting data on completed corporate inversions from 1983-2015, I find 
that 43 U.S. public firms that trade on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ, from 15 different 
industries have completed a corporate inversion and moved their legal tax domicile to one 
of ten different countries. Large firms that are less profitable (measured by ROA) are more 
likely to invert and the inversion target location is more likely to have greater tax freedom 
and investment freedom. The overall market reaction of the inversion announcement is 
positive and significant over a seven day (-3, +3) event window and this is driven by more 
recent inversions (post 2004) to non-tax haven countries (Canada, Australia, and 
European). Ex-post the inverted firms show no significant change in taxes compared to a 
matched sample when controlling for industry, size, sales, and profitability.  
 
History of Tax Inversion 
 
Table 1.1 shows the frequency of completed inversions by year.  The first corporate 
tax inversion was completed by McDermott International, a Louisiana based engineering 
and construction firm, which relocated the corporations legal tax domicile to Panama in 
1983.  After McDermott made the move, other firms began to follow their lead and moved 
their legal incorporation address to Bermuda and the Cayman Islands throughout the mid 







Inversions by Year 
 
Year Freq. Percent Cum. 
1983 1 2.33 2.33 
1994 1 2.33 4.65 
1996 2 4.65 9.3 
1997 1 2.33 11.63 
1999 3 6.98 18.6 
2000 3 6.98 25.58 
2001 3 6.98 32.56 
2002 5 11.63 44.19 
2007 1 2.33 46.51 
2008 1 2.33 48.84 
2009 3 6.98 55.81 
2010 1 2.33 58.14 
2011 2 4.65 62.79 
2012 7 16.28 79.07 
2013 2 4.65 83.72 
2014 2 4.65 88.37 
2015 5 11.63 100 






This early type of inversions required little more than having an office abroad and 
simply filing the necessary paperwork to legally “move” the incorporation address to 
another country.  For example, below is an excerpt from the news release when an electrical 
equipment supplier Cooper Industries, Inc. (NYSE: CBE) announced the companies’ 
intentions to invert in 2001: 
“Cooper Industries, Inc. (NYSE:CBE) today announced that its Board of 
Directors has approved a plan to reorganize the Company and change its 
place of incorporation from Ohio to Bermuda. Under the plan, Cooper 
Industries, Ltd., a newly-formed Bermuda corporation, will become the 
parent holding company of Cooper Industries, Inc.” 
This is an example of a restructuring in which the inversion requires no 
merger/acquisition of an existing firm in the target country or a significant business 
presence in the new incorporation location.  The CEO of Cooper Industries explains 
why the firm decided to move to Bermuda, “More and more of Cooper's revenues 
are being derived from operations and customers outside the United States,” said 
H. John Riley, Jr., chairman, president and chief executive officer... Consequently, 
we believe that by changing our legal domicile to Bermuda, we will generate 
increased value and returns for our shareholders because we will be able to take 
advantage of business, financial and strategic opportunities that are not available 
under our current structure. The reorganization will accelerate our strategic 
initiatives, enhance our competitiveness regarding international acquisition 
opportunities and improve our global tax position to generate increased cash flow.”  




day-to-day operations for our employees, customers and suppliers. Cooper will 
continue to have its headquarters in Houston, and we remain fully committed to our 
employees and the local communities where we have operations."   
Over a span of four years (1999-2002) we see a surge of 14 inversions without 
another until 2007 as displayed in Table 1.1.  This sudden break in inversion activity is a 
result of Congress enacting the American Jobs Act and sections 7874, 4985, and 965 of the 
Internal Revenue Code in 2004.  This was created to discourage inversions and required 
that the new foreign firm meet several conditions otherwise it would be treated as a 
domestic firm for tax purposes.  One of these conditions stated that the resulting 
corporation must have substantial business presence in the foreign country of 
incorporation.  “Substantial business presence” was later defined in 2006 to examine “the 
number of employees, pay of employees, property, sales, historical presence, management 
activities, and the strategic importance of the new country of domicile.”  This definition of 
substantial business presence was again modified in 2012 and required that, post-inversion, 
the firm must have at least 25% of its employees (in number and compensation), 25% of 
its income derived, and 25% of its assets located in the new country of domicile.  This 
pattern continues and in 2014 and 2015 the Treasury and IRS released notices and new 
regulations making it more difficult for a US firm to move its legal tax domicile.   
Enacting the American Jobs Act of 2004, temporarily slowed the rate of major US 
corporations inverting; however, as we see in Table 1.2 these new regulations simply 
pushed the firms to relocate to other countries rather than the islands in the Caribbean.  




by way of mergers and acquisitions; i.e. the inverting firm would buy out a company and 




Number of Inversions Before/After American Jobs Act (January 1, 2004) and  
Location of New Domicile 
 
Location Before 01/01/04 After 01/01/04 Total 
Caribbean 17 1 18 
Other 2 23 25 
Total 19 24 43 
 
 
Cooper Industries later moved from Bermuda to Ireland in 2009 citing “the need to 
better manage its cost structure, including taxes and regulatory costs.”  Cooper then became 
a target for another firm, Eaton Corporation (NYSE: ETN), which acquired Cooper 
Industries in 2012 and Eaton was then reincorporated in Ireland.  Following is the news 
release from Eaton’s 8K filing with the SEC, “At the close of the transaction, which is 
expected in the second half of 2012, Eaton and Cooper will be combined under a new 
company incorporated in Ireland, where Cooper is incorporated today. “We’re excited 
about bringing together two great companies to create shareholder value and continue our 
global growth. This combination significantly expands our ability to better serve our 
customers with their demands for critical energy saving technologies as they address the 
impact of the world’s growing energy needs.” Cutler said (Eaton’s CEO).” 
Cooper’s CEO stated that this “combination creates endless opportunities to 




distribution, penetrating important vertical industries and entering new emerging markets. 
The two companies are a perfect fit in every respect.”  In the announcement of Cooper’s 
re-organization to Bermuda and to Ireland taxes are listed as one of the reasons/benefits; 
however in this inversion in 2012 between Eaton and Cooper there is no mention of taxes 
anywhere in the SEC 8K filing and all of the wording is focused on the “synergies” 
associated with these companies which are “a perfect fit in every respect.” 
Table 1.3 displays the new country of incorporation for the 43 inversion firms and 
the respective country’s corporate tax rate as of January 01, 2016. 1  With 0.0% corporate 
tax rate, Bermuda and the Cayman islands were attractive new tax homes in the 1990’s and 
early 2000’s.  After the American Jobs Act, Ireland and Switzerland became the new 
popular destinations with corporate tax rates of 12.5% and 8.5% respectively.  The average 
corporate tax rate in the United States is 35% with marginal rates as high as 39%.   The 
latest wave of Treasury regulations came in April of 2016, which resulted in Pfizer and 
Allergan calling off their planned $152 billion merger, which would have moved Pfizer’s 
tax domicile to Ireland.  The figures in Table 1.3 raise an interesting question; if inverting 
is purely about taxes, why don’t all firms (post 2004 regulations) relocate to Ireland or 
Switzerland (12.5% and 8.5% tax rate respectively)?  Perhaps, the target firm in the merger 
and acquisition is a good investment and the tax inversion is just a “bonus” in the deal but 
not necessarily the main goal.   
  
                                                 
1 Table 1.3 refers to the destination countries which the inversion firms first changed the tax domicile from 
the United States.  Many of these firms later moved from the Caribbean to Switzerland or Ireland; other 






Inversions by Target Country of Legal Domicile and Corporate Tax Rates 
 
Country Corporate tax rate Number of Inversions Percent 
Australia   30.00%   1 2.33 
Bermuda      0.00% 12 27.91 
Canada         18.00%   3  6.98 
Cayman Islands   0.00%   5 11.63 
Ireland 12.50% 10 23.26 
Israel 25.00%   1  2.33 
Netherlands 25.50%   3  6.98 
Panama 25.00%   1  2.33 
Switzerland   8.50%   2  4.65 
United Kingdom 20.00%   5 11.63 
Total  43 100 
 
 
If firms are pursuing poor acquisition target firms in order to qualify for 
incorporating outside of the United States, do the tax benefits out-weigh the costs of poor 
acquisitions?  Examining these questions is beyond the scope of this paper but a possible 




 The data for the firms that successfully completed corporate inversions was 
collected from Bloomberg, The Wall Street Journal, Reuters, and Congressional Research 




included 77 unique firms.  My sample was then limited to include only publicly traded 
firms on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ, which consists of 43 individual firms.  The 
announcement date of the inversion and the date that the inversion was completed (by 
corporate restructuring/reincorporation or through merger/acquisition) was hand collected 
by reading the firm’s 10K filings, 8K filings and prospectuses on Capital IQ.  The 
completed dates for my sample of 43 inversions range from 1983-2015.   
Annual data was collected from COMPUSTAT for all NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ firms for the period 1980-2015.   The data includes annual firm financials (e.g. 
assets, sales, taxes, etc.) and firm classifications (e.g. 4-digit SIC codes, country of 
incorporation, tickers, gv-key, CUSIP).   
Table 1.4 shows that the 43 inversion firms are dispersed throughout 15 different 
Fama-French 48 industry classifications with the pharmaceutical industry and petroleum 
and natural gas industry making up about 40% of the inversions. 
To control for differences in industry, I restricted the COMPUSTAT sample to 
include only firms in these 15 industry classifications.  The final sample consists of annual 
firm data for 6,910 firms in 15 industries for the period 1980-2015.  All financials are 
adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index collected from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.  All tax variables are scaled by total assets.  Federal taxes represent the amount 
of taxes payable to the federal government. For non-U.S. companies, this item represents 
taxes payable to their government. Foreign taxes represent the amount of taxes payable to 
foreign governments.  For non-U.S. companies, this item represents taxes payable to 
governments outside their country.  Tax represents all income taxes imposed by federal, 






Number of Inversions by Industry 
 
Fama-French 48 Industries Freq. Percent Cum. 
Consumer Goods 1    2.33 2.33 
Medical Equipment 4    9.30 11.63 
Pharmaceutical Products 9 20.93 32.56 
Chemicals 1    2.33 34.88 
Construction 2    4.65 39.53 
Machinery 3    6.98 46.51 




1    2.33 53.49 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 8 18.60 72.09 
Business Services 1    2.33 74.42 
Computers 2    4.65 79.07 
Electronic Equipment 2    4.65 83.72 
Wholesale 1    2.33 86.05 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 2    4.65 90.70 
Insurance 4    9.30 100 
Total 43 100  
 
 
Table 1.5 displays the summary statistics for the full sample of firms and all 
variables are adjusted for inflation using 2006 as the base year.  Logat refers to the natural 




represents total income tax scaled by total assets. Federal tax, foreign tax, and change in 
tax are scaled by total assets and change in tax refers to the change in total tax each year.  
Earnings represent a firm’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 




Summary Stats; Firm Financials 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
logat 64,494   4.1046330 2.1184260 -9.4167920 9.8020310 
roa 81,944 -12.0567700 62.0864700 -1358.954 865.8696 
tax (total) 63,834 -0.0357819 10.4038300 -2476.457 634.2681 
federal tax 33,806 0.0105595 0.0273916 -0.4286453 0.6995782 
foreign tax 34,798 0.0029582 0.0110677 -0.1525320 0.8430034 
change in tax 68,946 -0.0843976 14.8555900 -2587.906 654.3375 
earnings 63,865 -0.1535955 5.0769120 -1018 22.6250000 
 
 
 Data measuring “Economic Freedom” for each country is collected from The 
Heritage Foundation’s “Index of Economic Freedom” which is composed of 10 
quantitative and qualitative factors for 186 countries from 1995-2017.  This data was 
merged with the Compustat/Inversion dataset based on the country of incorporation for 
each firm in each year.  Each of the following measures are calculated on a scale of 0-100 
and a higher score indicates greater economic freedom: property rights, government 
integrity, tax freedom, government spending, business freedom, labor freedom, monetary 




country’s tax freedom the component score is derived from three quantitative sub-factors: 
the top marginal tax rate on individual income, the top marginal tax rate on corporate 
income, and the total tax burden as a percentage of GDP and each of the numerical 
variables is equally weighted. 
 According to Heritage Index Appendix “the scale used for scoring government 
spending is non-linear, which means that government spending that is close to zero is 
lightly penalized while levels of government spending that exceed 30 percent of GDP lead 
to much worse scores and only extraordinarily large levels of government spending, for 
example. Over 58 percent of GDP receive a score of zero.2”  
 Regarding Investment Freedom, the Index deducts points (from the ideal score of 
100) based on the rules and regulations that countries have in place restricting investment; 
for example, national treatment of foreign investment, foreign investment code, restrictions 
on land ownership, and capital controls among others.  
 Table 1.6 displays the summary statistics for the Heritage Economic Freedom 
variables.  All 10 of these measures are on a scale of 0-100, with 0 being the worst or lowest 
economic freedom and 100 being the most economic freedom for the given measure.  On 
average, these scores range from 57-94 with several measures reaching a maximum of 100 
for a given year/country in the sample (specifically government integrity, business 
freedom, and labor freedom). Alternatively government spending, monetary freedom and 
trade freedom report minimum scores of 0 for at least a given year and given country in 
the sample.  
  
                                                 






Summary Stats, Economic Freedom Measures 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
property rights 135,367 .8755051 .05196521 0.150 0.950 
government integrity 135,367 .7583324 .06576185 0.100 1.000 
tax freedom 135,367 .6591281 .03956701 0.298 0.978 
government spending 135,367 .5788021 .08986099 0.000 0.993 
business freedom 135,369 .8740234 .04560342 0.355 1.000 
labor freedom   70,981 .9428374 .07471037 0.310 1.000 
monetary freedom 135,367 .8236106 .04012430 0.000 0.954 
trade freedom 135,372 .8250144 .04220754 0.000 0.950 
investment freedom 135,371 .7219597 .05059450 0.200 0.950 
financial freedom 135,372 .7667871 .09667257 0.200 0.900 
 
 
Figure 1.1 displays the overall Economic Freedom score (equally-weighted) for the 
United States, Ireland, and the World average (all 186 countries in the Index) from 
1995-2017.  Both the United States and Ireland show greater levels of overall economic 
freedom than the world average for the entire time period and the scores mainly fall in the 








    Figure 1.1 Economic Freedom Overall Score- United States, Ireland, and the Global  
                   Average Over Time 
 
 
 Figure 1.2 shows the level of Investment Freedom for Ireland, United States, 
Switzerland, and the World average over the same time period as Figure 1.1.  Ireland has 
a score of 90 or above for Investment Freedom from 2001-2017, while the United States 
varies from 70-80 and Switzerland pushes past the United States around 2009 and 
continues to rise.  All three countries score higher than the World average for each year in 
















































































































Figure 1.2 Economic Freedom- Investment Freedom- United States, Ireland, Switzerland  
               and the Global Average Over Time 
 
 
 Figure 1.3 displays Tax freedom in terms of economic freedom (higher score 
indicates a greater tax freedom and thus greater economic freedom).  In the late 1990’s 
Ireland had the lowest economic freedom in terms of tax freedom and over time has become 
more economically free than the United States and Switzerland.  The World average scores 
the highest in terms of tax freedom. The United States consistently scores in the 60’s and 
never scores above 70 for the entire sample period.  The United States also seems to be 
decreasing in tax freedom from 2012-2017.  Switzerland reports the highest scores until 
about 2004 when it drops below Ireland and levels out with the United States until around 


















































































































Figure 1.3. Economic Freedom- Tax Freedom (Higher Score Indicates More Economic 
                  Freedom) United States, Ireland, Switzerland and the Global Average  
                  Over Time 
 
 
Figure 1.4 shows the scores for government spending for the same countries and 
the world average.  The index uses all levels of government spending (federal, state, and 
local) when the data are available and scales these levels as a portion of GDP.  This measure 
refers to the level of economic freedom in terms of government spending; therefore higher 
scores reflect more economic freedom rather than higher government spending. This figure 
seems to have the most variation especially for Ireland and Switzerland.  The average score 
for the world stays between the mid to upper 60’s; the United States ranges from the upper 
40’s to the lower 70’s; and the scores for Ireland and Switzerland range from the 20’s to 

















































































































Figure 1.4 Economic Freedom- Government Spending (Higher Score Indicates More 
                 Economic Freedom)- United States, Ireland, Switzerland and the Global  





 I first estimate the determinants of inversion using a logit model and all regressions 
include industry fixed effects3 (Gormley and Matsa, 2013) and robust standard errors.  The 
dependent variable is a 0/1 indicator variable which takes a values of one if the firm 
completed an inversion for that year and 0 otherwise (i.e. inversion equals one only 43 
times, once for each inversion firm). 
Determinants of Inversion 
 Table 1.7 displays the estimates for the logit regression in which the dependent 
variable is a 0/1 indicator which takes the value of one if the country of incorporation is 
the target of an inversion that year.  
                                                 
























































































































* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                            
N                  119948           42526           42526          119948           42526   
R-squared          0.0517           0.135           0.158           0.187           0.309   
                                                                                            
industry FE           Yes             Yes             Yes             Yes             Yes   
                  (-1.81)         (-1.53)         (-2.61)         (-4.88)         (-1.65)   
_cons              -15.20          -4.034          -7.768**        -18.65***       -32.07   
                                                                   (1.96)          (0.35)   
financialf~d                                                        2.705           2.052   
                                                                   (9.78)          (3.47)   
investment~d                                                        21.97***        24.27***
                                                                  (-1.46)          (0.77)   
tradefreed~d                                                       -6.696           13.08   
                                                                  (-1.26)         (-1.77)   
monetaryfr~d                                                       -4.255          -14.02   
                                                  (-1.58)                         (-0.42)   
government~2                                       -26.36                          -2.586   
                                  (-3.13)         (-1.97)                          (1.78)   
laborfreed~d                       -5.192**        -4.434*                          4.304   
                                   (1.15)          (1.78)                         (-1.69)   
businessfr~d                        3.741           4.997                          -9.919   
                                  (-2.47)          (1.40)                         (-1.05)   
govspendin~d                       -5.159*          12.04                          -5.833   
                  (-0.24)                                                          (3.04)   
taxfreedom~d       -1.788                                                           13.14** 
                   (1.93)                                                          (1.45)   
government~d        5.702                                                           10.48   
                   (0.48)                                                         (-0.66)   
propertyri~d        3.451                                                          -5.856   
inversion                                                                                   
                                                                                            
                inversion       inversion       inversion       inversion       inversion   
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)   




The independent variables are the Heritage Index economic freedom measures with 
a higher score indicating more economic freedom in that area, and all models include 
industry fixed effects.  Model 1 includes property rights, government integrity, and tax 
burden measures as explanatory variables and none of the measures are statistically 
significant.  Model 2 includes government spending, business freedom, and labor freedom 
and both government spending and labor freedom are negative and significant.  Model 3 
attempts to control for the non-linear government spending measure and includes a 
government spending squared term.  Model 4 includes monetary freedom, trade freedom, 
investment freedom, and financial freedom as independent variables and investment 
freedom is positive and significant.  Model 4 includes all economic freedom measures as 
independent variables and tax freedom is positive and significant and investment freedom 
is positive and significant.  This suggests that countries with more tax economic freedom 
and more investment freedom are more attractive targets for firms seeking to invert.  
Table 1.8 includes firms size, natural log of total assets (logat), a proxy for firm 
profitability (roa), and total tax (tax).  Logat is positive and statistically significant at the 
0.01 level and roa is negative and insignificant and tax is not statistically significant.  In 
the second model, I add R&D expense (randd) and financial leverage (finlev), and change 
in sales from the previous year (changeinsales), none of which are significant.  Model 3 
includes a Caribbean tax index and investment index which is calculated as the difference 
in the U.S. Heritage index scores from the average of the Caribbean nation’s index scores.4  
Caribtax is positive and highly significant suggesting that the difference in tax freedom 
from the U.S. is a significant predictor of firm inversion.   
                                                 




Table 1.8  
 
Logit Regression, Caribbean and European Tax Freedom and Investment Freedom 





Caribinv is also positive and significant suggesting that investment freedom plays 
a role in the inversion decision although the magnitude is much smaller than the tax 
variable.  Model 4 tests the same idea as Model 3 but uses the average of European nations 
scores from the business freedom index to calculate the difference from the U.S. scores.  
The results in this model suggest that neither difference in tax nor investment freedom 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                                            
N                    5207            1561          141687          141687           15146           15146   
R-squared          0.0938          0.0235          0.0486          0.0456           0.104          0.0978   
                                                                                                            
Year FE               Yes             Yes              No              No              No              No   
Industry FE           Yes             Yes             Yes             Yes             Yes             Yes   
                  (-5.13)         (-4.58)         (-3.87)         (-4.42)         (-5.09)         (-1.57)   
_cons              -12.56***       -5.835***       -32.40***       -6.987***       -15.70***       -19.45   
                                                                  (-1.10)         (-1.18)                   
euroinv                                                           -0.0451         -0.0921                   
                                                                  (-0.65)          (1.02)                   
eurotax                                                           -0.0699           0.216                   
                                                   (2.58)                                         (-0.01)   
caribinv                                            1.119**                                       -0.0101   
                                                   (2.88)                                          (0.60)   
caribtax                                            6.898**                                         2.266   
                                  (-1.45)                                                                   
L.changein~s                      -0.0240                                                                   
                                   (1.01)                                                                   
L.randd                           0.00323                                                                   
                                  (-0.74)                                                                   
L.finlev                           -0.158                                                                   
                   (0.66)                                                          (1.50)          (1.35)   
L.tax             0.00310                                                          0.0277          0.0233   
                  (-0.97)                                                         (-0.54)         (-0.56)   
L.roa            -0.00405                                                        -0.00266        -0.00271   
                   (2.92)                                                          (3.04)          (3.09)   
L.logat             0.856**                                                         0.732**         0.745** 
inversion                                                                                                   
                                                                                                            
                inversion       inversion       inversion       inversion       inversion       inversion   
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)   




plays a role the inversion decision when the inverting firm moves to a European nation.  In 
Models 5 and 6 the firm size, roa, and tax are included with the Caribbean and European 
indices and the results remain unchanged for size, roa, and tax however the significance 
for the Caribbean indices does not hold.   Perhaps surprisingly total tax (tax) is not 
significant in any model and provides no evidence that the decision to invert is driven by 
taxes.  
Market Reaction  
 This section examines the stock market reaction of the firm announcing the 
intention and plans of inverting.  The estimation period was 240 trading days prior to the 
announcement date and the event window is seven days, three days before and three days 
after  (-3, +3) the announcement date (t=0) and the Fama and French 3-Factor model  plus 
momentum was used to calculate expected returns.5  Figure 1.5 displays the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR’s) for all announcements (33 firms without missing return data) 
over the seven day window.  Overall the CAR’s are statistically significant and positive 
and greater than 2.5%.  Figure 1.6 looks at the CAR’s for only the firms that announced 
the inversion decision prior to 2004 which was when the American Jobs Act was passed 
and the when many of these inverting firms were moving to “tax havens” in the Caribbean.  
There are 11 events for this study and on average the CAR’s are negative but not 
statistically significant.  In contrast, Figure 1.7 is the inversion announcement post 2004 
and these CAR’s are significantly positive and greater than 5% over the seven-day window 
with most of the return falling in the three-day period around the announcement date.  For 
                                                 
5 The results are robust to using the 3-factor model, market model, and three-day event window; although 
the cumulative abnormal returns were smaller in magnitude when using the three-day window, they are still 




robustness, Figures 1.8 and 1.9 break the subsamples based on “tax haven” destinations 
(Caribbean) and non-tax haven destinations (Canada, Europe, and Australia) and the results 
hold.  Figure 1.8 are the events in which the inverting firm announces plans to move to a 
Caribbean Island and we see a slightly negative but insignificant reaction; and Figure 1.9 
are non-tax haven moves and we see a positive and significant reaction greater than 5%.  
These results suggest that overall the firms see a positive stock price shock upon the 
announcement of inverting and this is driven by the more recent inversions (post 2004) and 




Notes: Event Study: 7-day window (-3, +3) around inversion announcement date (t=0) using Fama French 
three factor model and momentum to estimate returns (240-day estimation period excluding one 
month prior to event).  Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR’s) for all inverting firm announcements 
(33 firms without missing returns). 
 












Notes: Event Study: 7-day window (-3, +3) around inversion announcement date (t=0) using Fama French 
three factor model plus momentum to estimate returns (240-day estimation period excluding one 
month prior to event).  Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR’s) for all inverting firm announcements 
before the American Jobs Act in 2004 (11 events without missing returns). 
 





Notes: Event Study: 7-day window (-3, +3) around inversion announcement date (t=0) using Fama French 
three factor model plus momentum to estimate returns (240-day estimation period excluding one 
month prior to event).  Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR’s) for all inverting firm announcements 
after the American Jobs Act in 2004 (22 events without missing returns). 
 





Notes: Event Study: 7-day window (-3, +3) around inversion announcement date (t=0) using Fama French 
three factor model plus momentum to estimate returns (240-day estimation period excluding one 
month prior to event).  Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR’s) for all inverting firm announcements 
in which the inverting firm moves to a country considered a “tax haven” (12 events and move to a 
Caribbean tax haven). 
 




Notes: Event Study: 7-day window (-3, +3) around inversion announcement date (t=0) using Fama French 
three factor model plus momentum to estimate returns (240-day estimation period excluding one 
month prior to event).  Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR’s) for all inverting firm announcements 
in which the inverting firm moves to a country that is not considered a “tax haven” (19 events and 
move to Europe, Canada, or Australia). 
 





Results of Inversion  
This section focuses on the relationship between the completed inversion and the 
subsequent effect the inversion has on the firm’s total, federal, and foreign taxes. All tax 
variables are scaled by total assets and all regressions include firm fixed effects, industry 
fixed effects, and robust standard errors.  
 Table 1.9 displays the estimates of regressing total tax (scaled by total assets) on an 
indicator variable if the firm inverted that year and controls (earnings and sales).  If 
inversion results in lower taxes, we would expect the inversion dummy variable to be 
negative and significant in the regression.  In model 1, inversion has no effect on tax.  This 
could be due to the limited time period, this is the concurrent measures for tax and 
inversion, therefore in Models 2 and 3, I include a 1-year and 2-year lagged inversion 
dummy in the regression.  If the firm does not realize the tax benefits of inverting until one 
or two years after inverting, then the lagged variables should be negative and significant, 
assuming inversion lowers taxes.  In both Models 2 and 3, the one year and two year lagged 
inversion indicator variables (L.inversion and L2.inversion) are positive and not 
statistically significant, implying that inverting has no effect on total taxes the year of 












Table 1.10 displays the estimates of regressing federal taxes (scaled by total assets) 
on an indicator variable if the firm inverted that year and control variables (earnings and 
sales).  Although we see no significant relation between inversion and total taxes, perhaps 
there is a negative relationship between inverting and federal taxes.  In Model 1 inversion 
is negative but not significant, and in Models 2 and 3 with the inclusion of one and two 




inversion 0.0189 0.019 0.0192
(0.55) (0.54) (0.54)
earnings 0.00035 0.000345 0.00034
(1.08) (1.07) (1.07)






constant 0.00617 0.00591 0.0054
(1.04) (0.96) (0.85)
industry FE Yes Yes Yes
firm FE Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.000238 0.00024 0.000243
N 59876 58966 57968
t statistics in parentheses











 Table 1.11 displays the estimates of regressing foreign taxes (scaled by total assets) 
on an indicator variable if the firm inverted that year and control variables (earnings and 
sales).  The estimates in Model 1 are statistically significant and positive for inversion, 
indicating inversion has a positive effect on foreign taxes.  One theory for this finding could 
be that after a firm completes the inversion most firms still have their headquarters, 
operations, and a large sales base in the United States, and post-inversion this would now 
be recorded as foreign taxes since the firm’s country of incorporation would no longer be 
the United States.  In Model 3, we see that one-year post-inversion still has a positive effect 




inversion -0.0025 0.9975 1.9975
(-0.69) (-0.70) (-0.71)
earnings 0.000242** 0.000242** 0.000242**
(3.20) (3.21) (3.22)






constant 0.0129*** 0.0129*** 0.0129***
(4.91) (4.92) (4.93)
industry FE Yes Yes Yes
firm FE Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.0428 0.0428 0.0428
N 32543 32543 32543
t statistics in parentheses











Propensity Score Matching 
In order to further examine the effects of inversion on the taxes a firm pays, I use 
propensity score matching and match on several control variables.  The intuition is to match 
each inversion firm with the most similar firm and the only difference being that the match 
did not complete an inversion.  Then we can look at the difference between the variable of 
interest (total tax, federal tax, foreign tax, earnings, etc.)   
Table 1.12 displays the estimates of the difference in total tax and changes in tax 
(both scaled by total assets) when firms are matched with the single closest propensity 
score.  The propensity scores are estimated using a logit regression and the dependent 
variable is the inversion indicator and independent variables are firm size (logat), sales, 
(1) (2) (3)
fortax fortax fortax
inversion 0.00469 0.0047 0.00469
(2.41) (2.41) (2.41)
earnings 0.0000269 0.0000269 0.0000269
(1.85) (1.85) (1.85)






constant 0.00241 0.00241 0.00241
(1.74) (1.74) (1.74)
industry FE Yes Yes Yes
firm FE Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.0414 0.0414 0.0414
N 33505 33505 33505
t statistics in parentheses




and profitability (roa).  The average treatment effect (with inversion being the treatment) 
is the coefficient estimate and is estimated using robust standard errors and industry fixed 
effects.  We see that the difference in taxes for the inversion firms compared to their 
matched sample is positive but not statistically significant.  Inversion firms also do not see 
a significant change in tax compared to the matched firm based on industry, size, 




Propensity Score Matching; Ex Post Difference in Total Tax and Change in Tax One 
Year After Completed Inversion 
 
  Variable Coefficient  Z P>z Obs.  
Average treatment Effect: 
Inversion (1 vs. 0) 
Tax  .0223428 1.17 0.241 54,798 
Change in tax .0261819 1.06 0.289 60,265 
  
Note:   Average treatment effects, inversion vs. non-inversion matched firm. Matched on industry, logat, 
sales, and roa 
 
 
To further examine the effects of inverting, Table 1.13 displays the estimates of 
difference in earnings, profitability (roa), and cash matching the inversion firms on industry 
and size (logat).  The average treatment effect of inverting does not have a significant effect 








Propensity Score Matching; Difference in Firm Financial Variables 
 
  Variable Coefficient  Z P>z Obs.  
Average treatment Effect: 
Inversion (1 vs. 0) 
earnings .1809757 0.45 0.651 57,400 
ROA 15.61826 0.46 0.647 58,869 
  cash 77.68246 1.74 0.083 44,908 





 There were 43 U.S. public firms on the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ in 15 different 
industries that reincorporated in another country over the period 1983 to 2015.  These 
changes in legal tax domicile were once simple restructurings which allowed the inverting 
firm to claim a new tax domicile, but as a result of stricter regulations, firms have become 
more creative in how to invert and most occur through a merger or acquisition of a foreign 
based firm and then the U.S. based firm changes the incorporation to the country with a 
lower corporate tax rate.  In the 1990’s the tax-free islands of the Caribbean were the 
standard for inverting firms, but since the American Jobs Act of 2004 the majority of 
inversion firms are reincorporating in Europe.   
 Large firms that are less profitable (measured by ROA) are more likely to invert 
and the inversion target location is more likely to have greater tax freedom and investment 
freedom. The overall market reaction of the inversion announcement is positive and 
significant over a seven day (-3, +3) event window and this is driven by more recent 




Ex-post, the inverted firms show no significant change in taxes compared to a matched 
sample when controlling for industry, size, sales, and profitability.  
 These results call for future research to examine the effects of inversion on 
shareholder value and studying the target firms in the inversion merger/acquisitions both 
pre- and post- inversion.  Are these firms good candidates for the acquirer or are they 
simply a loophole to get around the tax code and achieve a lower tax domicile?  Initial 
evidence suggests that these acquisitions may be value creating given the positive market 







DETERMINANTS OF FOR-PROFIT MICROFINANCE 




“There are two kinds of businesses in the world.  One is a business which makes money, 
and the other solves the problems of the world.” 




Microfinance has evolved and changed since the early years in the 1980’s when Dr. 
Muhammad Yunus founded the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and set out to provide loans 
to the poor who often don’t have access to capital.  One of the major changes in 
microfinance is the growth in for-profit institutions which not only provide access to 
finance to the poor but do so with the aim of distributing profits to shareholders.  Other 
changes in the industry of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) include rapid growth in the 
number of active MFIs, a broader range of financial services offered, an increase in 
business volume, and changes in the types of MFIs (Roberts, 2013).  The growth of for-
profit MFIs and commercial banks breaking into this sector began debates about whether 
it is possible to effectively blend nonprofit ideals (namely social outreach and performance) 
and for-profit orientations and practices; i.e. financial performance and sustainability 
(Morduch, 2000).   
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The other side argues that the non-profit sector of MFIs perhaps has purer 
motives, but is less efficient, smaller, and unable to reach the demand for credit among 
the world’s poor.  As a result, we have seen for-profit MFIs, some of which are even 
publicly traded companies (i.e. Elektra, SKS Microfinance, Compartamos Banco), 
continue to grow in number and size.  Vikram Akula, the founder of SKS Microfinance 
in India (renamed Bharat Financial Inclusion), claimed to grow three times as fast as 
Grameen Bank and argues that there is a place for both non-profit and for-profit MFIs 
and more than one approach is needed to reach the three billion people in poverty lacking 
access to finance (Bahree, 2010).  
The goal of this paper is exploratory in nature and seeks to study the evolution of 
the international microfinance industry, specifically the differences in for-profit and non-
profit institutions.  Is there a place for profit seeking firms in the business of providing 
the poor access to loans and other financial services?  Can these firms sustainably operate 
while also fulfilling the mission for whom non-profit microfinance institutions were 
originally created?  Which types of firms are more successful, both financially and 
socially and what are the determinants of this success?  Do country specific formal 
institutions, cultural dimensions, and development play a role in the performance 
(financially and socially) and likelihood of MFIs being for-profit institutions?  And what 









Data was collected from the MIX Market (Microfinance Information Exchange) 
database to analyze MFIs between 1999 and 2016.  MIX collects financial, operational, 
and social performance data from MFIs around the world and participation in the MIX 
database is voluntary.   The sample is limited to those institutions which are classified as 
either non-profit or for-profit; this includes 2,477 institutions (17,616 institution-years) 
and represents MFIs from 120 countries and six geographic regions (the United States is 
not included).   
Table 2.1 shows the number of MFIs by geographic region and we see that Africa 
and Latin America and The Caribbean make up nearly half of the total MFIs.  Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia consists of about 19% of the sample while South Asia is about 
17%.  East Asia and the Pacific are home to about 12% of MFIs in the sample and the 




The Number of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) by Geographic Region 
 
Region # of MFIs Percent Cum. % 
Africa 636 25.68 25.68 
East Asia and the Pacific 301 12.15 37.83 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 470 18.97 56.8 
Latin America and The Caribbean 586 23.66 80.46 
Middle East and North Africa 69 2.79 83.25 
South Asia 415 16.75 100 
    
Total 2,477 100   
 
 
Table 2.2 displays the countries and the respective number of non-profit, for-
profit, and total MFIs which reported data for at least one year during the sample period.  
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We see that the proportion of non-profit to for-profit MFIs throughout the sample is 
almost equal with 1,364 non-profit (55.07%) and 1,113 for-profit (44.93%) MFIs.  The 
total number of countries represented as having at least one MFI, either for-profit or non-




The Number of Individual MFIs Per Country by Profit Status (Non-Profit and For-Profit) 
 
  Profit Status  
     
Country  Non-profit Profit Total 
     
Afghanistan  15 2 17 
Albania  1 6 7 
Angola  0 2 2 
Argentina  11 7 18 
Armenia  3 13 16 
Azerbaijan  12 26 38 
Bangladesh  77 2 79 
Belarus  0 2 2 
Belize  1 0 1 
Benin  33 2 35 
Bolivia  18 9 27 
Bosnia and Herzegov..  11 5 16 
Brazil  37 9 46 
Bulgaria  23 2 25 
Burkina Faso  18 3 21 
Burundi  11 8 19 
Cambodia  1 19 20 
Cameroon  16 11 27 
Central African Rep..  2 0 2 
Chad  3 1 4 
Chile  4 3 7 
China, People's Rep..  38 10 48 
Colombia  30 15 45 
Comoros  3 0 3 
Congo, Democratic R..  17 8 25 
Congo, Republic of ..  3 1 4 
Costa Rica  17 1 18 
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Table 2.2 (Continued) 
 
Cote d'Ivoire (Ivor..  24 7 31 
Croatia  2 0 2 
Dominican Republic  10 7 17 
East Timor  2 1 3 
Ecuador  65 6 71 
Egypt  15 0 15 
El Salvador  12 8 20 
Ethiopia  4 19 23 
Gabon  0 1 1 
Gambia, The  0 2 2 
Georgia  7 14 21 
Ghana  20 51 71 
Grenada  0 1 1 
Guatemala  25 2 27 
Guinea  4 4 8 
Guinea-Bissau  4 0 4 
Guyana  1 0 1 
Haiti  5 3 8 
Honduras  17 11 28 
Hungary  0 1 1 
India  104 108 212 
Indonesia  21 45 66 
Iraq  12 0 12 
Jamaica  3 2 5 
Jordan  7 1 8 
Kazakhstan  1 39 40 
Kenya  15 22 37 
Kosovo  8 4 12 
Kyrgyzstan  22 17 39 
Laos  2 23 25 
Lebanon  3 2 5 
Liberia  1 2 3 
Macedonia  3 1 4 
Madagascar  10 5 15 
Malawi  7 2 9 
Malaysia  1 0 1 
Mali  18 2 20 
Mexico  11 101 112 
Moldova  0 10 10 
Mongolia  2 12 14 
Montenegro  0 3 3 
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Table 2.2 (Continued) 
    
Morocco  10 0 10 
Mozambique  6 4 10 
Myanmar (Burma)  2 5 7 
Namibia  1 1 2 
Nepal  24 20 44 
Nicaragua  25 12 37 
Niger  12 2 14 
Nigeria  5 74 79 
Pakistan  26 15 41 
Palestine  3 4 7 
Panama  2 4 6 
Papua New Guinea  2 5 7 
Paraguay  3 4 7 
Peru  45 28 73 
Philippines  44 54 98 
Poland  2 2 4 
Romania  2 5 7 
Russia  93 23 116 
Rwanda  2 10 12 
Saint Lucia  0 1 1 
Samoa  0 1 1 
Senegal  26 8 34 
Serbia  1 3 4 
Sierra Leone  6 7 13 
Slovakia  1 0 1 
Solomon Islands  0 1 1 
South Africa  10 5 15 
Sri Lanka  8 14 22 
Sudan  1 1 2 
Suriname  0 3 3 
Swaziland  0 1 1 
Syria  3 0 3 
Tajikistan  17 31 48 
Tanzania  11 6 17 
Thailand  1 2 3 
Togo  30 0 30 
Tonga  1 0 1 
Trinidad and Tobago  2 1 3 
Tunisia  1 0 1 
Turkey  2 0 2 
Uganda  12 14 26 
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Table 2.2 (Continued) 
    
Ukraine  2 1 3 
Uruguay  1 1 2 
Uzbekistan  14 21 35 
Venezuela  0 2 2 
Vietnam  20 0 20 
Yemen  6 2 8 
Zambia  4 5 9 
Zimbabwe  2 4 6 
     
Total  1,364 1,113 2,477 
 
 
Table 2.3 presents the top 15 countries with the most MFIs; total MFIs in panel A, 
non-profits in panel B, and for-profits in panel C.  In panel A, we see that the top five 
nations (India, Russia, Mexico, the Philippines, and Bangladesh) make up nearly a 
quarter of the MFIs in the total sample with 24.91%; and India clearly has the largest 
proportion of individual MFIs overall with 212 making up about 9% of the sample.  It is 
also notable that the top 15 nations in Panel A include nearly half of the total MFIs in the 
sample from 120 different nations.  Panels B and C divide the sample into subsamples 
based on profit status and show that India is also the leader in non-profit and for-profit 
MFIs making up 7.62% and 9.7% respectively; and India is also rather evenly distributed 
between non-profit and for-profit MFIs with 104 and 108 respectively.  This even 
distribution is not the case for the other top countries as Russia has four times as many 
non-profits (93 to 23 for-profit) and Mexico’s MFIs are almost entirely for-profit (101 to 
11 non-profit).  One of Mexico’s most famous MFIs is Compartamos which began in 
1990 as a nonprofit organization supported by aid from international donors and aimed to 







Top 15 Nations in Terms of Total (Panel A), Non-Profit (Panel B), and For-Profit  
(Panel C) MFIs 
 
Panel A 
All MFIs by top 15 countries   
Country  Freq. Percent Cum. 
     
India  212 8.56 8.56 
Russia  116 4.68 13.24 
Mexico  112 4.52 17.76 
Philippines  98 3.96 21.72 
Bangladesh  79 3.19 24.91 
Nigeria  79 3.19 28.1 
Peru  73 2.95 31.05 
Ecuador  71 2.87 33.91 
Ghana  71 2.87 36.78 
Indonesia  66 2.66 39.44 
China  48 1.94 41.38 
Tajikistan  48 1.94 43.32 
Brazil  46 1.86 45.18 
Colombia  45 1.82 46.99 




Non-Profit MFIs  by Country   
  Freq. Percent Cum. 
     
India  104 7.62 7.62 
Russia  93 6.82 14.44 
Bangladesh  77 5.65 20.09 
Ecuador  65 4.77 24.85 
Peru  45 3.3 28.15 
Philippines  44 3.23 31.38 
China  38 2.79 34.16 
Brazil  37 2.71 36.88 
Benin  33 2.42 39.3 
Colombia  30 2.2 41.5 
Togo  30 2.2 43.7 
Pakistan  26 1.91 45.6 
Senegal  26 1.91 47.51 
Guatemala  25 1.83 49.34 
Nicaragua  25 1.83 51.17 
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Panel C     
     
For-Profit MFIs by Country   
  Freq. Percent Cum. 
     
India  108 9.7 9.7 
Mexico  101 9.07 18.78 
Nigeria  74 6.65 25.43 
Philippines 54 4.85 30.28 
Ghana  51 4.58 34.86 
Indonesia 45 4.04 38.9 
Kazakhstan 39 3.5 42.41 
Tajikistan  31 2.79 45.19 
Peru  28 2.52 47.71 
Azerbaijan 26 2.34 50.04 
Laos  23 2.07 52.11 
Russia  23 2.07 54.18 
Kenya  22 1.98 56.15 
Uzbekistan 21 1.89 58.04 
Nepal  20 1.8 59.84 
 
 
Today Compartamos is one of the largest MFIs in Central and South America and 
through its growth and strong profits (criticized by some as due to exceedingly high interest 
rates) the firm issued an IPO in the spring of 2007 and is traded as Gentera on the Mexico 
Stock Exchange (market cap about $1.67 billion USD). 
On the other end of the spectrum, Bangladesh only has two for-profit MFIs out of 
the 79 total, perhaps not surprising since this is the birthplace of Grameen Bank which was 
started by Dr. Muhammad Yunus (awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and considered the father 
of microfinance).  Yunus is adamantly against for-profit firms participating in this business, 
even stating, “You could build a microfinance program, either as a profit-maximizing 




to be skewed toward the non-profit with 65 of its 71 MFIs claiming a non-profit status.  
Nigeria and Ghana on the other hand are mainly for-profit MFIs with 94% and 72% 
respectively.   
It is important to note that a non-profit MFI may in fact be financially profitable.  
The difference between a for-profit and a non-profit firm lies in the ownership of the 
company and how profits are distributed.  A for-profit firm may choose to distribute a 
portion of the profits back to shareholders or to invest back into the company.  A non-
profit firm will not have outside shareholders or investors expecting a return on their 
investment therefore a strong focus on profitability may not exist as one would expect 
within a for-profit institution.  The earnings of a non-profit would then be reinvested back 
into the corporation to pursue the firm’s social mission.  The goal of a for-profit 
institution should be to maximize shareholder value, whether that is private investors or 
owners of the stock (if the firm is a public company).  Table 2.4, subdivides the sample of 
non-profit and for-profit MFIs into six different legal statuses; i.e. Banks; Credit 
Unions/Cooperatives; Non-Banking Financial Institution (NBFI); Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO); Other; and Rural Banks.  Not surprisingly banks and rural banks 
are mainly for-profit institutions; and these make up about 15% of the sample.  Credit 
Unions/Cooperatives and NGO’s are largely non-profit and comprise about half of the 
sample while Non-banking Financial Institutions are typically for-profit and represent 






MFI Current Legal Status by Profit Status 
 
    Profit Status   
Current Legal Status  Non-Profit Profit Total 
     
Bank  6 228 234 
Credit Union / Coop  469 45 514 
NBFI  121 662 783 
NGO  725 14 739 
Other  20 15 35 
Rural Bank  17 131 148 
     
Total   1,358 1,095 2,453 
 
 
Data was also collected from the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) which includes annual data for 95 countries from 2005-2017.  This 
database is an index of ratings from 1-6 (1=low, 6=high) for different sectors of the 
country’s economy.  These variables include: building human resources; business 
regulatory environment; equity of public resource use; financial sector; property rights 
and rule based governance; social protection and labor market; and transparency, 
accountability, and corruption in the public sector.   
In order to study the cultural effects on microfinance, data was also collected from 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions; which includes six different indices (power distance, 
individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long term vs short term orientation, 
and indulgence vs restraint) with scores ranging from 0-100 (low to high) for 109 
different countries.  MIX data was merged with World Bank CPIA data and Hofstede’s 





Table 2.5 presents summary statistics for all MFIs (panel A), only for-profit MFIs 
(panel B), and only non-profit MFIs (panel C).  From panel A we see that overall MFIs 
have about $5.17 million in assets at the median and a wide range in size from $195,379 
to $249 million for the 5th and 95th percentile respectively.  Administrative expenses are 
about 8% of total assets at the mean and the average salary at the MFI is nearly double 
the Gross National Income per capita at the 25th percentile and 4.5 times larger at the 
mean.  The average loan per borrower scaled by GNI is a measure of depth of the 
institution and is about 80% at the mean.  The average number of borrowers per loan 
officer is 322 and the mean (median) number of loans per officer is 1195 (250.6).  The 
average borrower retention rate is 77% and the mean (median) number of active 
borrowers, a proxy for outreach, is roughly 77,000 (8,698).  The mean (median) board 
size is 12.4 (7) and loans outstanding are 100,319 (11,006).  The average loan portfolio is 
about 50 million and the median is about $4.36 million.  The mean (median) number of 
new borrowers is 865,185 (4508) and the mean (median) number of start-ups financed is 
11,711 (159).  The mean (median) percentage of the board that is female is 31% (27%) 
and the percentage of female borrowers at the mean and median is about 65%.  The 
average profit margin is 4.59 however the median is only 0.1032; and mean (median) 
return on assets (roa) is 0.006 (0.0198).   The average staff turnover rate is about 22% and 
as high as 67% at the 95th percentile.  Average tax expense is $421,998 but is zero for the 
fifth, 25th and 50th percentile indicating many of these institutions pay no taxes.  The real 
yield at the mean (median) is 24.7 % (20.48%) and the mean (median) effective interest 
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[calculated as (total interest income on loan portfolio + income from penalty 




Summary Statistics; All MFIs (Panel A), For-Profit MFIs (Panel B), For-Profit  
MFIs (Panel C) 
 
Panel A: All MFIs 
variable mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 
       
adminexp_asset 0.082034 0.0158 0.0375 0.0605 0.0993 0.2137 
assets 4.77E+11 195379.7 1334125 5173398 2.33E+07 
2.49E+0
8 
avgloanperborrowGNI 0.814923 0.04 0.1262 0.2962 0.7062 2.5252 
AveragesalaryGNIpercapit
a 4.567483 0.81 1.86 2.93 5.26 13.95 
borrower_officer 322.6839 61 150.6667 240.1429 360.3079 750.2927 
borrower_retention 0.770445 0.4687 0.6711 0.769 0.8573 1 
revenue_assets 0.270294 0.0981 0.1722 0.2348 0.3305 0.553 
loan_port_gross 4.36E+11 118442.3 920618 3754264 1.70E+07 
1.89E+0
8 
int_loan_port 1.02E+11 45591.11 362544.9 1327789 5756596 
4.64E+0
7 
loans_officer 1195.357 65.6 155.7941 250.625 379.7857 823.625 
active_borrow 76643.23 229 2197 8698 31668 226870 
board 12.37396 3 5 7 8 15 
loans_out 100319.6 352 2928 11006 41489 299489 
avg_loan_port 5.00E+07 169562.7 1127320 4356311 1.88E+07 
2.02E+0
8 
new_borrow 865185 44 895 4508 18933 145044 
start_ups_fin 11711.72 0 3 159 3024 41076 
sufficient 1.163914 0.4892 0.9883 1.1149 1.2865 1.7904 
rev_loans 1.12E+11 55766.51 412972.6 1522020 6369522 
5.08E+0
7 
board_female 0.31338 0 0.1429 0.2727 0.4286 0.8571 
borrow_female 0.650847 0.1977 0.439 0.6477 0.9277 1 
profit_margin 4.585595 -1 -0.0094 0.1032 0.2226 0.4416 
roa 0.006124 -0.1642 -0.0007 0.0198 0.0495 0.1222 
staff_turnover 0.220279 0 0.0746 0.1615 0.286 0.6705 
tax 421997.9 0 0 0 51962.11 1370092 
yield_real 0.247182 0.0369 0.1297 0.2048 0.3201 0.6092 




(Table 2.5 Continued) 
 
Panel B: For-Profit MFIs 
variable mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 
       
adminexp_asset 0.085243 0.0171 0.0395 0.0647 0.1065 0.2225 
assets 1.09E+12 245370.1 2228928 9527360 4.31E+07 4.46E+08 
avgloanperborrowGNI 1.064613 0.0329 0.14 0.3865 0.8662 3.4733 
AveragesalaryGNIpercapita 5.054558 0.88 1.94 3.25 6.115 15.25 
borrower_officer 303.0687 52.875 126.1163 220.3043 353.081 751.4693 
borrower_retention 0.77128 0.4664 0.6716 0.7665 0.8548 1 
revenue_assets 0.287029 0.1064 0.1832 0.2473 0.3486 0.6147 
loan_port_gross 9.96E+11 151133.6 1440185 6697661 3.14E+07 3.38E+08 
int_loan_port 2.24E+11 52822.31 563411.8 2334826 9979812 8.12E+07 
loans_officer 502.2887 56.33825 131.0695 229.9304 372.9479 856.2387 
active_borrow 97167.83 209 2738 12066 44387 330597 
board 6.481431 2 5 6 8 12 
loans_out 113061.8 347 3796 15357 56351 419052 
avg_loan_port 7.78E+07 218985 1841729 7629051 3.40E+07 3.53E+08 
new_borrow 51981.72 22 1046.5 6310.5 29244.5 223015 
start_ups_fin 18315.14 0 2 73.5 1787.5 40582 
sufficient 1.163286 0.5298 1.008 1.1223 1.2831 1.7424 
rev_loans 2.46E+11 68390.59 648513.5 2669590 1.10E+07 8.73E+07 
board_female 0.256033 0 0.1111 0.2 0.375 0.7143 
borrow_female 0.620091 0.1704 0.4162 0.6 0.8765 1 
profit_margin 10.63303 -0.8549 0.0082 0.1088 0.22 0.4252 
roa 0.01171 -0.1404 0.0017 0.02 0.0457 0.1246 
staff_turnover 0.264512 0 0.1007 0.19745 0.3558 0.772 
tax 824232.8 -3126.39 0 21765.86 242855 2992617 
yield_real 0.271166 0.0411 0.13355 0.2197 0.3454 0.7191 









(Table 2.5 Continued) 
 
Panel C: Non-Profit MFIs 
variable mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 
       
adminexp_asset 0.079407 0.0147 0.0358 0.0571 0.0943 0.2047 
assets 3.32E+07 163854.4 1012559 3365702 1.34E+07 1.12E+08 
avgloanperborrowGNI 0.623162 0.0465 0.1161 0.2456 0.5869 1.8973 
AveragesalaryGNIpercapita 4.180039 0.74 1.81 2.77 4.55 13.04 
borrower_officer 338.3135 72.8475 170.8182 251.1613 365.7527 750 
borrower_retention 0.769746 0.4732 0.6704 0.7731 0.8595 1 
revenue_assets 0.2573 0.09305 0.16605 0.2247 0.3173 0.5049 
loan_port_gross 2.67E+07 102258.1 704096.3 2502414 9949773 8.27E+07 
int_loan_port 5897564 41238.97 261619.1 876628.8 3323971 2.18E+07 
loans_officer 1744.19 77.8889 176.2 262.7647 382.7619 787.3333 
active_borrow 60873.39 245 1942 6724.5 22604 147722 
board 16.87224 3 5 7 9 17 
loans_out 89838.03 355 2501 8484 29979 193850 
avg_loan_port 2.84E+07 142064.5 839199.9 2845184 1.10E+07 8.83E+07 
new_borrow 1564418 64 800 3387 12448 77973 
start_ups_fin 7351.695 0 5 320 3496 41076 
sufficient 1.164399 0.4657 0.9657 1.108 1.2889 1.8258 
rev_loans 6346352 50400.83 301891.9 995242.8 3641035 2.36E+07 
board_female 0.355254 0 0.1667 0.3 0.5 1 
borrow_female 0.672934 0.2151 0.4542 0.681 0.9531 1 
profit_margin -0.08543 -1.0791 -0.0316 0.0982 0.2245 0.4548 
roa 0.001781 -0.1837 -0.0038 0.0196 0.0524 0.1206 
staff_turnover 0.180663 0 0.0571 0.1347 0.2353 0.504 
tax 94640.82 0 0 0 1449 269004.1 
yield_real 0.227427 0.0344 0.1278 0.1935 0.303 0.5113 
effective_int 0.281058 0.108625 0.18357 0.244607 0.343661 0.567885 
 
 
When we calculate the summary statistics individually for only for-profit MFIs 
(panel B) and non-profit MFIs (Panel C) several differences stand out.  Specifically, for-
profit MFIs appear to be larger, have more administrative expenses, greater depth, pay 
higher salaries, have a larger loan portfolio and make more from interest from the loan 
portfolio, have greater outreach, finance more start-ups, are more profitable, have a 
higher staff turnover rate, pay more tax, and charge higher interest rates.  Non-profit 
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MFIs seem to be busier (borrowers per officer and loans per loan officer), have a bigger 
board with more females on the board, have more new borrowers, and a larger percentage 
of borrowers are female. The borrower retention rate and level of MFI sufficiency are 
about the same for both groups at 77% and 1.16 respectively.   
In order to more formally test these differences between for-profit and non-profit 
MFIs I perform t-tests for a difference in means for all variables in Table 2.5.  The results 
(difference of non-profit – for-profit) and t-stats are presented in Table 2.6.  A negative 
difference in means indicates a larger average for for-profit MFIs and a positive 
difference indicates a larger average for non-profit MFIs.  Almost all variables are larger 
for the for-profit MFIs with the exceptions being: borrowers per loan officer, board size, 
percentage of female borrowers, and percentage of females on the board, all of which are 
positive and statistically significant for non-profit MFIs.  Administrative expenses, depth, 
salary, size (revenue_assets), outreach (active_borrow), loan portfolio, roa, turnover, tax, 
and both measures of interest (yield_real and effective_int) are larger on average for the 
for-profit MFIs and are statistically significant.  The differences in assets, borrower 
retention, gross loan portfolio, interest from loan portfolio, number of loans per loan 
officer, loans outstanding, number of new borrowers, start-ups financed, MFI sufficiency, 






T-Tests for Difference in Variable (Mean) for Non-Profit and For-Profit MFIs 
 
T-tests difference in means 
non-profit(mean) - For-profit(mean) 
Variable difference in means t-stat 
adminexp_asset -0.00584** -2.73 
assets -1.09E+12 -1.14 
avgloanperborrowGNI -0.441*** -4.79 
AveragesalaryGNIpercapita -0.875*** -7.78 
borrower_officer 35.24* 2.42 
borrower_retention -0.00153 -0.12 
revenue_assets -0.0297*** -9.06 
loan_port_gross -9.96E+11 -1.13 
int_loan_port -2.24E+11 -1.09 
loans_officer 1241.9 1.12 
active_borrow -36294.4*** -5.29 
board 10.39*** 4.49 
loans_out -23223.8 -1.63 
avg_loan_port -49416656.4*** -10.08 
new_borrow 1512436.4 1.29 
start_ups_fin -10963.4 -1.12 
sufficient 0.00111 0.07 
rev_loans -2.46E+11 -1.09 
board_female 0.0992*** 13.46 
borrow_female 0.0528*** 10.79 
profit_margin -10.72 -1.14 
roa -0.00993*** -3.84 
staff_turnover -0.0838*** -12.88 
tax -729592.0*** -13.47 
yield_real -0.0437*** -12.42 
effective_int -0.0508*** -14.95 
N 16164              
t statistics in parentheses   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
 
 
This provides initial support that for-profit MFIs seem to be more profitable 
(measured by roa), have greater depth and outreach, have more administrative expenses 
and pay larger salaries than non-profit MFIs.  It also appears that for-profit MFIs have 
more staff turnover, pay more in taxes, and charge higher rates than non-profit MFIs.   
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As discussed previously in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, we see many countries that tend to 
have either a majority of for-profit MFIs or non-profit MFIs; for example, Mexico and 
Bangladesh.  In order to further study this difference Table 2.7 displays the results of a 
logit regression with the dependent variable being a 0/1 dummy variable indicating if the 
MFI is for-profit and the only independent variable included is an indicator variable 
specifying the country for each MFI. 
The results of this estimation are only useful to study the sign and significance for 
the respective country’s coefficient; thus a positive and significant result indicates the 
country tends to have for-profit MFIs (e.g.  Albania, Bolivia, Peru, and Ukraine) while a 
negative and significant result indicates the country’s propensity to have non-profit MFIs 
(e.g. Bangladesh, Costa Rica, and Guatemala).  The countries with more for-profit MFIs 
do not seem to be due to geographic location as we see wide dispersion throughout 
multiple continents and not all countries within each continent or region are of the same 
profit status.  Therefore, what characteristics about certain countries tend to be more 
attractive homes for for-profit MFIs?   
In order to study this research question I collected data on measures of formal 
institutions at the country level from World Bank.  The first set of formal institutions that 
I use is the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) from the World Bank 





Country Effects on For-Profit MFIs 
 
 
                              For-profit
Afghanistan                   0 Chad                          -1.220 Honduras                      1.453*** Montenegro                    0 Serbia                        2.867*** Vietnam                       0
                              (.)                               (-1.15)                               (5.18)                               (.)                               (7.11)                               (.)
Albania                       3.233*** Chile                         2.092*** Hungary                       0 Morocco                       0 Sierra Leone                  1.788*** Zambia                        2.482***
                              (8.20)                               (5.56)                               (.)                               (.)                               (4.76)                               (6.35)
Angola                        0 Colombia                      0.738** India                         1.935*** Mozambique                    1.327*** Solomon Islands               0 Zimbabwe                      3.280***
                              (.)                               (2.65)                               (7.54)                               (4.07)                               (.)                               (5.45)
Argentina                     1.365*** Comoros                       0 Indonesia                     2.144*** Namibia                       0.690 South Africa                  1.088** Constant                      -1.671***
                              (4.46)                               (.)                               (7.74)                               (0.96)                               (3.05)                               (-6.68)
Armenia                       2.847*** Costa Rica                    -1.561** Iraq                          0 Nepal                         1.689*** Sri Lanka                     2.070*** Observations                  13694
                              (8.91)                               (-3.22)                               (.)                               (6.19)                               (6.87) Pseudo R-squared              0.214
Azerbaijan                    1.967*** Croatia                       0 Jamaica                       2.652*** Nicaragua                     1.346*** Sudan                         0.754 t statistics in parentheses
                              (7.05)                               (.)                               (4.91)                               (4.95)                               (1.17) * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001
Bangladesh                    -1.909*** Dominican Republic            1.546*** Jordan                        -0.251 Niger                         0.204 Suriname                      0
                              (-5.36)                               (5.04)                               (-0.63)                               (0.54)                               (.)
Belarus                       0 Ecuador                       -0.0295 Kazakhstan                    4.342*** Nigeria                       3.087*** Tajikistan                    2.112***
                              (.)                               (-0.11)                               (11.41)                               (10.13)                               (7.64)
Belize                        0 El Salvador                   1.694*** Kenya                         2.109*** Pakistan                      1.263*** Tanzania                      0.624
                              (.)                               (5.79)                               (7.41)                               (4.62)                               (1.94)
Benin                         -1.795*** Ethiopia                      2.973*** Kosovo                        0.677* Panama                        1.845*** Thailand                      4.156***
                              (-3.71)                               (9.40)                               (2.06)                               (4.76)                               (3.88)
Bolivia                       1.111*** Gabon                         0 Lebanon                       1.208** Papua New Guinea              2.923*** Togo                          0
                              (4.04)                               (.)                               (3.04)                               (6.69)                               (.)
Bosnia and Herzegovina        0.647* Gambia 0 Liberia                       3.375*** Paraguay                      2.524*** Tonga                         0
                              (2.17)                               (.)                               (4.18)                               (7.15)                               (.)
Brazil                        0.233 Georgia                       2.211*** Madagascar                    0.978** Peru                          1.190*** Trinidad and Tobago           1.488*
                              (0.78)                               (7.27)                               (3.17)                               (4.55)                               (2.27)
Bulgaria                      -0.167 Ghana                         2.167*** Malawi                        0.531 Philippines                   1.719*** Tunisia                       0
                              (-0.51)                               (7.79)                               (1.39)                               (6.58)                               (.)
Burkina Faso                  0.783* Guatemala                     -1.768*** Malaysia                      0 Poland                        2.045*** Turkey                        0
                              (2.33)                               (-3.86)                               (.)                               (4.40)                               (.)
Burundi                       1.256*** Guinea                        1.916*** Mali                          -1.266** Romania                       2.841*** Uganda                        2.322***
                              (3.79)                               (4.77)                               (-2.74)                               (7.72)                               (7.85)
Cambodia                      5.197*** Guinea-Bissau                 0 Mexico                        4.087*** Rwanda                        2.384*** Ukraine                       1.211**
                              (11.35)                               (.)                               (14.18)                               (6.75)                               (2.72)
Cameroon                      1.788*** Guyana                        0 Moldova                       0 Samoa                         0 Uruguay                       2.364**
                              (6.00)                               (.)                               (.)                               (.)                               (3.15)
Central African Republic      0 Haiti                         1.480*** Mongolia                      3.517*** Senegal                       -0.256 Uzbekistan                    2.309***
                              (.)                               (4.45)                               (8.82)                               (-0.77)                               (7.49)







This data includes ratings of 1-6 (1=low, 6=high) for the following sectors of the 
country’s economic sector: building human resources (human_resources); business 
regulatory environment (business_regulatory); equity of public resource use 
(public_resource); financial sector (financial_sector); property rights and rule-based 
governance (property_rights); social protection and labor market (social_protection); and 
transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector 
(transparency_accountability).  This index attempts to measure the framework and 
development of the government, legal system, protection and regulations within a 
country's economy and I use these to proxy for formal institutions.   
Table 2.8 shows the logit regression estimates with the dependent variable as an 
indicator variable equal to one if the MFI is a for-profit institution and the independent 
variables are the CPIA measures of formal institutions, control variables, and year fixed 
effects for all models.  The results suggest in models 1-6 that each of the formal 
institution measures is positive and significant in the likelihood of the MFI being a 
for-profit institution.  The only measure that is not significant is the transparency and 
accountability rating.  Overall these results suggest that more developed countries in 





Table 2.8  
 





Along with formal institutions, informal cultural characteristics within countries 
such as power distance, masculinity, and individualism may play a role in for-profit MFIs 
being more concentrated in certain countries.  In order to study this, I include Hofstede’s 
six dimensions of national cultural (power distance, individualism, masculinity, 
uncertainty avoidance, long term orientation, and indulgence vs restraint) in the logit 
regression in Table 2.9.  The power distance index expresses the degree to which 
societies accept that power is distributed unequally and in cultures with a high degree of 
power distance we would expect a hierarchical order of status and place.   
                              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
                              for-profit for-profit for-profit for-profit for-profit for-profit for-profit
debt_equity                   -0.000147 -0.000121 -0.000138 -0.000141 -0.000125 -0.000130 -0.000122
                              (-0.64) (-0.60) (-0.64) (-0.65) (-0.61) (-0.61) (-0.60)
assets                        4.69e-10*** 5.40e-10*** 5.13e-10*** 5.31e-10*** 5.24e-10*** 4.83e-10***5.19e-10***
                              (3.31) (3.66) (3.47) (3.70) (3.59) (3.43) (3.60)
borrow_female                 -1.189*** -0.949*** -1.077*** -1.069*** -1.040*** -0.986*** -0.983***
                              (-10.62) (-8.98) (-10.03) (-9.93) (-9.49) (-9.28) (-9.13)
human_resources               0.449***
                              (6.46)
business_regulatory           0.265***
                              (4.55)
public_resource               0.468***
                              (7.29)
financial_sector              0.335***
                              (5.86)
property_rights               0.163**
                              (2.66)
social_protection             0.231**
                              (3.13)
transparency_accountability   0.0508
                              (0.92)
_cons                         -1.275*** -0.730** -1.404*** -0.837*** -0.235 -0.541* 0.0708
                              (-4.95) (-3.09) (-5.61) (-3.93) (-1.16) (-2.00) (0.38)
Year FE                       Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N                             5035 5035 5035 5035 5035 4965 5035
pseudo R-sq                   0.025 0.022 0.027 0.024 0.020 0.020 0.019
t statistics in parentheses




Table 2.9  
 





Individualism can be defined as a focus on self and the immediate family, 
compared with the other end of the spectrum, collectivism, in which the self-image would 
be more connected to a group or relatives.  A culture with a high degree of masculinity 
would be more focused on achievement and success with a high degree of competition.  
Uncertainty avoidance refers to the attitude toward the future and unknown; high degrees 
of uncertainty avoidance uphold strict belief and behavior while societies with lower 
degrees will have a more comfortable approach to change and the future.  Cultures with 
                              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
                              for-profit for-profit for-profit for-profit for-profit for-profit
debt_equity                   -0.0000801 -0.000352 -0.0000993 -0.000106 -0.0000934 -0.0000815
                              (-0.46) (-0.95) (-0.51) (-0.54) (-0.50) (-0.45)
assets                        4.16e-10*** 4.88e-10*** 4.43e-10*** 3.91e-10*** 1.78e-10 1.68e-10
                              (3.61) (4.08) (4.04) (3.31) (1.76) (1.66)
borrow_female                 -0.424*** -1.155*** -0.627*** -0.496*** -1.069*** -1.117***
                              (-4.05) (-10.09) (-5.87) (-4.43) (-11.66) (-11.94)
power distance                          0.0174***
                              (7.28)
idividualism                        0.0471***
                              (21.54)
masculinity                           0.0505***
                              (17.40)
uncertainty avoidance -0.00820***
                              (-5.29)
long term orientation -0.00543***
                              (-3.65)
indulgence vs restraint 0.0170***
                              (16.87)
_cons                         -1.471*** -0.946* -2.828*** 0.406 0.700* -0.174
                              (-3.73) (-2.52) (-7.12) (1.05) (2.25) (-0.55)
Year FE                       Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N                             5834 5834 5834 5834 6399 6431
pseudo R-sq                   0.021 0.080 0.058 0.018 0.033 0.063
t statistics in parentheses




high levels of long term orientation will encourage education and other efforts to prepare 
for the future while lower scores would indicate a preference for traditions and norms and 
hesitant to change.  Indulgent societies are after gratification of natural human drives of 
enjoying life and pursuing fun, while restraint focuses on regulation and strict social 
norms.  
 These results suggest that countries with higher scores in power distance, 
individualism, masculinity, and indulgence tend to have more for-profit MFIs while 
countries with lower uncertainty avoidance and long term orientation tend to have more 
for-profit MFIs.  This makes intuitive sense as we would expect more competition and 
inequality to favor for-profit business structures as well as a stronger focus on the 
individual compared to the group.   
 This has helped to shed light on the determinants of for-profit MFIs in terms of 
formal institutions (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment measures from the 
World Bank) and the informal cultural dimensions (Hofstede’s cross cultural 
dimensions).  The next section attempts to investigate the effect of formal institutions and 
cultural dimensions on financial and social performance.   
 Financial performance, measured as return on assets (roa), is the dependent 
variable in Table 2.10 and is regressed against a dummy variable equal to one if the MFI 
is a for-profit institution, control variables (debt to equity, assets, and percentage of 
female borrowers) and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions.  All models include year fixed 













 The estimates from Table 2.10 suggest that for-profit MFIs are not more 
profitable but rather a culture with a greater power distance and a more collectivism focus 
is related to greater MFI financial performance.  Power distance is positive and 
statistically significant indicating that countries with a greater hierarchical structure and 
inequality tend to be more advantageous to for-profit MFIs.  Individualism and 
uncertainty avoidance are both negative and significant indicating that less individualistic 
cultures tend to have more profitable MFIs.  This finding supports the widely used 
                              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
                              roa roa roa roa roa roa
for_profit                -0.00480 0.00410 -0.00336 -0.00284 0.00229 0.00187
                              (-1.32) (1.08) (-0.89) (-0.78) (0.59) (0.47)
debt_equity                   -0.00000130 -0.000000360 -0.00000136 -0.00000162 -0.000000986 -0.000000787
                              (-0.22) (-0.06) (-0.23) (-0.27) (-0.15) (-0.12)
assets                        1.10e-11 8.63e-12 1.03e-11 9.36e-12 1.14e-11 1.16e-11
                              (1.87) (1.46) (1.74) (1.58) (1.73) (1.75)
borrow_female                 -0.00699 0.0202** 0.00410 -0.00147 0.00166 0.000199
                              (-1.03) (2.85) (0.60) (-0.20) (0.25) (0.03)
power distance                         0.00116***
                              (7.83)
individualism -0.000752***
                              (-5.54)
masculinity 0.000220
                              (1.30)
uncertainty avoidance -0.000230*
                              (-2.30)
long term orientation 0.0000740
                              (0.66)
indulgence vs restraint 0.0000125
                              (0.17)
_cons                         -0.0741** 0.00797 -0.00969 0.0213 -0.00623 -0.00357
                              (-2.95) (0.34) (-0.39) (0.85) (-0.26) (-0.15)
Year FE                       Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N                             5254 5254 5254 5254 5634 5653
R-sq                          0.018 0.012 0.006 0.007 0.014 0.016
t statistics in parentheses




practice of group lending throughout the microfinance literature, in which the institution 
makes group loans and the group agrees to cross-guarantee each other’s loans.  For 
example, Esperanza International, a non-profit MFI located in the Dominican Republic, 
employs a model that utilizes group loans to a group of five people and after the borrower 
gains reputation capital and creditworthiness through multiple successful group loan 
cycles and demonstrating growth in their business entrepreneurs can qualify for larger, 
individual business loans.   
 Table 2.11 tests the existence and strength of formal institutions within a country 
and the effect on MFI financial performance by regressing the individual MFIs return on 
assets (profitability) on the World Bank CPIA measures of formal institutions as well as 
control variables and the for-profit indicator variable.  Building human resources, 
business regulatory environment, public resource use, and social protection and labor 
market are all positive and significant suggesting that countries with more developed 
institutions in these areas tend to have more profitable MFIs.  Surprisingly the strength of 
financial sector is negative and not statistically significant and property rights are also not 
significant in determining MFI profitability.   
 The next test explores the social performance of MFIs in terms of cultural 
dimensions and formal institutions within the country.  The average loan size is a 
common proxy for social performance throughout the microfinance literature.  MFIs that 
make smaller loans are considered to have better social performance, as smaller loans are 
reaching the most under banked and those with the greatest need for financing (for 
robustness I also tested the percentage of female borrowers and the number of active 











 Table 2.12 presents the results of regressing loan size (average loan size scaled by 
Gross National Income per capita) on the for-profit indicator variable, control variables, 
and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions.  The estimates suggest that for-profit MFIs tend to 
have lower social performance (i.e. larger loans) as do larger MFIs in terms of total 
assets.  Countries with a higher degree of power distance, individualism, masculinity, and 
indulgence tend to have MFIs with better social performance.  Higher uncertainty 
avoidance and long term orientation tend to have MFIs with lower levels of social 
performance using the loan size proxy.   
                              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
                              roa roa roa roa roa roa roa
debt_equity                   -0.00000153 -0.000000951 -0.00000155 -0.000000942 -0.00000104 -0.00000132 -0.000000701
                              (-0.30) (-0.18) (-0.30) (-0.18) (-0.20) (-0.26) (-0.14)
assets                        5.34e-12 8.27e-12 6.61e-12 8.10e-12 7.91e-12 6.06e-12 8.45e-12
                              (0.95) (1.46) (1.17) (1.43) (1.40) (1.08) (1.49)
borrow_female                 -0.00526 0.0115* 0.00475 0.0111 0.00884 0.00858 0.0137*
                              (-0.86) (1.97) (0.81) (1.86) (1.46) (1.46) (2.29)
for_profit                0.00702* 0.00908** 0.00707* 0.00964** 0.00948** 0.00925** 0.00971**
                              (2.09) (2.69) (2.09) (2.84) (2.81) (2.74) (2.87)
human_resources               0.0349***
                              (8.85)
business_regulatory           0.0101**
                              (3.05)
public_resource               0.0272***
                              (7.47)
financial_sector              -0.0000912
                              (-0.03)
property_rights               0.00497
                              (1.40)
social_protection             0.0444***
                              (10.55)
transparency_accountability   -0.00739*
                              (-2.28)
_cons                         -0.110*** -0.0298* -0.0871*** 0.00594 -0.00765 -0.142*** 0.0252*
                              (-7.39) (-2.18) (-6.08) (0.48) (-0.64) (-9.07) (2.25)
Year FE                       Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N                             4556 4556 4556 4556 4556 4492 4556
R-sq                          0.027 0.012 0.022 0.010 0.010 0.035 0.011
t statistics in parentheses




Table 2.12  
 





 Table 2.13 presents the results for the formal institutions effect on MFI social 
performance and we see that all seven measures of formal institutions within a country 
tend to have MFIs with better social performance in terms of loan size.  From this table 
we also see that firms with more female borrowers tend to also issue smaller loans, 
perhaps by construction because both of these measures are commonly used as social  
  
                              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
                              loan size loan size loan size loan size loan size loan size
for_profit                    0.0582*** 0.0988*** 0.0947*** 0.0592*** 0.284*** 0.314***
                              (3.50) (5.86) (5.67) (3.60) (10.59) (11.64)
debt_equity                   -0.00000863 0.00000358 -0.00000783 -0.00000323 -0.0000181 -0.0000168
                              (-0.30) (0.12) (-0.27) (-0.11) (-0.34) (-0.32)
assets                        1.18e-10*** 9.98e-11*** 1.07e-10*** 1.18e-10*** 1.31e-10** 1.33e-10**
                              (4.77) (4.05) (4.35) (4.79) (3.05) (3.14)
power distance -0.00242***
                              (-3.64)
individualism -0.00686***
                              (-11.67)
masculinity -0.00939***
                              (-12.53)
uncertainty avoidance 0.00403***
                              (9.95)
long term orientation 0.00478***
                              (6.22)
indulgence vs restraint -0.00410***
                              (-7.90)
_cons                         1.142*** 1.116*** 1.467*** 0.685*** 0.575*** 0.909***
                              (10.37) (11.24) (13.84) (6.66) (3.76) (6.00)
Year FE                       Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N                             6868 6868 6868 6868 7642 7665
R-sq                          0.018 0.035 0.038 0.030 0.031 0.034
t statistics in parentheses




performance proxies.  These results also suggest that for-profit MFIs and larger MFIs 












This paper seeks to more broadly explore the differences among non-profit and 
for-profit Microfinance institutions, specifically the determinants in social and financial 
performance and the role of formal institutions within a country and informal cultural 
                              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
                              loan size loan size loan size loan size loan size loan size loan size
debt_equity                   0.00000477 0.00000248 0.00000621 0.0000167 0.00000777 0.00000579 0.0000100
                              (0.06) (0.03) (0.08) (0.21) (0.10) (0.07) (0.13)
assets                        2.90e-10** 2.68e-10** 2.90e-10** 2.61e-10** 2.87e-10** 2.91e-10** 2.86e-10**
                              (3.25) (3.03) (3.26) (2.95) (3.23) (3.28) (3.22)
borrow_female                 -1.640*** -1.741*** -1.667*** -1.603*** -1.590*** -1.679*** -1.632***
                              (-17.99) (-20.08) (-18.97) (-18.30) (-17.70) (-19.21) (-18.44)
for_profit                    0.270*** 0.281*** 0.280*** 0.292*** 0.267*** 0.270*** 0.259***
                              (5.37) (5.62) (5.56) (5.84) (5.33) (5.35) (5.18)
human_resources               -0.180**
                              (-3.09)
business_regulatory           -0.380***
                              (-7.69)
public_resource               -0.247***
                              (-4.57)
financial_sector              -0.422***
                              (-8.71)
property_rights               -0.308***
                              (-5.89)
social_protection             -0.425***
                              (-6.75)
transparency_accountability   -0.258***
                              (-5.43)
_cons                         2.496*** 3.230*** 2.741*** 3.204*** 2.734*** 3.275*** 2.588***
                              (11.48) (16.13) (13.06) (17.73) (15.70) (14.15) (15.95)
Year FE                       Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N                             5020 5020 5020 5020 5020 4950 5020
R-sq                          0.091 0.100 0.093 0.103 0.095 0.096 0.094
t statistics in parentheses




institutions.  Using a large dataset of more than 2,400 individual MFIs from 120 countries 
we find support for the growth of for-profit institutions as nearly half of the MFIs in the 
sample from 1999-2017 operate as for-profit.  Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean have 
the largest number of MFIs with a combined 1,222 unique institutions.  By country, India 
has the most MFIs in the sample, both total MFIs and for-profit/non-profit.  MFIs in 
Bangladesh are primarily non-profit (97.5%) while those in Mexico are mainly for-profit 
(90%).  In terms of legal status banks and non-banking financial institutions tend to be 
for-profit and Credit Unions and Non-governmental organizations are typically non-
profit.  
For-profit MFIs tend to have more administrative expenses, lower social 
performance (depth), pay higher salaries, are more profitable, and have more staff turnover 
when using t-tests for a difference in means between non-profit and for-profit MFIs.  For-
profit MFIs also appear to charge higher interest rates than non-profit.  Non-profit MFIs 
appear to be busier, have larger boards and more females on the board, and a greater 
percentage of female borrowers.   
The determinants of for-profit MFIs saturating a country as opposed to non-profit 
MFIs can be greater understood by examining the formal institutions and cultural 
dimensions within each country.  Formal institutions and development are collected from 
Country Profit and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index from the World Bank and are 
included in the analysis of (i) determinants of for-profit MFIs, (ii) MFI financial 
performance, and (iii) MFI social performance.  The findings suggest formal institutions 
such as; business regulatory environment, property rights, social protection, and a 




within a country.  Financial performance is also associated with countries with higher 
measures of human resources, business regulatory environment, public resource use, and 
social protection.   MFI social performance (smaller loan size) is associated with more 
development in all seven variables of CPIA formal institution metrics.   
Using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions to proxy for informal institutions and cultural 
characteristics within each country I find that cultures with greater degrees of power 
distance, individualism, masculinity and indulgence tend to have more for-profit MFIs.  
Greater power distance and more collectivism societies appear to have better financial 
performance in the MFIs consistent with the group lending models employed by many for-
profit and non-profit institutions alike.  Social performance also appears to improve within 
cultures with a greater degree of power distance, individualism, masculinity, and 
indulgence; while a negative relation in social performance is shown for larger, for-profit 
MFIs and cultures with higher uncertainty avoidance and long term orientation.  
The future avenues for research in this field could explore the economic impacts of 
the growth in Microfinance Institutions (both for-profit and non-profit) within individual 
cities and communities.  In my future research I will seek to collect more granular data 
from both MFIs within a community and from the borrowers and entrepreneurs regarding 









Increased globalization has led to several new avenues of research in international 
finance, specifically corporate tax inversion and microfinance institutions.   
 In the first essay I study corporate tax inversion which is a reorganization by 
which a domestic firm changes its tax-domicile from the United States to a foreign 
country with a lower corporate tax rate.  Through hand collecting data I find that there 
were 43 U.S. public firms on the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ in 15 different industries that 
reincorporated in another country over the period 1983 to 2015.  These changes in legal 
tax domicile were once simple restructurings which allowed the inverting firm to claim a 
new tax domicile, but as a result of stricter regulations, firms have become more creative 
in how to invert and most occur through a merger or acquisition of a foreign based firm 
and then the U.S. based firm changes the incorporation to the country with a lower 
corporate tax rate.  In the 1990’s the tax-free islands of the Caribbean were the standard 
for inverting firms, but since the American Jobs Act of 2004 the majority of inversion 
firms are reincorporating in Europe.  Large firms that are less profitable are more likely 
to invert and the inversion target location is more likely to have greater tax freedom and 
investment freedom. The overall market reaction of the inversion announcement is 




more recent inversions (post 2004) to non-tax haven countries (Canada, Australia, and 
European).  Ex-post, the inverted firms show no significant change in taxes compared to 
a matched sample when controlling for industry, size, sales, and profitability.   These 
results call for future research to examine the effects of inversion on shareholder value 
and studying the target firms in the inversion merger/acquisitions both pre- and post- 
inversion.  Initial evidence suggests that these acquisitions may be value creating given 
the positive market reaction for the announcing firm post 2004. 
In the second essay I explore the differences among non-profit and for-profit 
Microfinance institutions, specifically the determinants in social and financial performance 
and the role of formal institutions within a country and informal cultural institutions.  Using 
a large dataset of more than 2,400 individual MFIs from 120 countries I find that for-profit 
institutions consist of nearly half of the MFIs in the sample from 1999-2017.  India has the 
most MFIs in the sample, both total MFIs and for-profit/non-profit.  MFIs in Bangladesh 
are primarily non-profit (97.5%) while those in Mexico are mainly for-profit (90%).  I find 
that for-profit MFIs tend to have more administrative expenses, lower social performance 
(depth), pay higher salaries, are more profitable, and have more staff turnover when using 
t-tests for a difference in means between non-profit and for-profit MFIs.  For-profit MFIs 
also appear to charge higher interest rates than non-profit.  Non-profit MFIs appear to be 
busier, have larger boards and more females on the board, and a greater percentage of 
female borrowers.  The determinants of for-profit MFIs saturating a country as opposed to 
non-profit MFIs can be greater understood by examining the formal institutions and 
cultural dimensions within each country.  The findings suggest formal institutions such as; 




financial sector, have a positive effect on the likelihood of for-profit MFIs within a country.  
Financial performance is also associated with countries with higher measures of human 
resources, business regulatory environment, public resource use, and social protection.   
MFI social performance (smaller loan size) is associated with more development in all 
seven variables of CPIA formal institution metrics.  Using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
to proxy for informal institutions and cultural characteristics within each country I find that 
cultures with greater degrees of power distance, individualism, masculinity and indulgence 
tend to have more for-profit MFIs.  Greater power distance and more collectivism societies 
appear to have better financial performance in the MFIs consistent with the group lending 
models employed by many for-profit and non-profit institutions alike.  Social performance 
also appears to improve within cultures with a greater degree of power distance, 
individualism, masculinity, and indulgence; while a negative relation in social performance 
is shown for larger, for-profit MFIs and cultures with higher uncertainty avoidance and 
long term orientation.  The future avenues for research in this field could explore the 
economic impacts of the growth in Microfinance Institutions (both for-profit and non-
profit) within individual cities and communities.  In my future research I will seek to collect 
more granular data from both MFIs within a community and from the borrowers and 
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Descriptive Summary Statistics by Profit Status 
 
Panel A  Panel D 
    Profit Status    Profit Status 
Outreach  Non-profit Profit  Diamonds  Non-profit Profit 
Large  21.46% 31.55%  0  2.85% 0.85% 
Medium  19.97% 22.49%  1  5.32% 4.99% 
Small  58.58% 45.96%  2  8.97% 12.61% 
  Total  100.00% 100.00%  3  34.78% 28.67% 
     4  39.40% 41.53% 
Panel B  5  8.69% 11.35% 
Age       Total  100.00% 100.00% 
Mature  72.20% 56.90%      
New  10.54% 20.08%  Panel E 
Young  17.27% 23.02%  
Target 
Market    
  Total  100.00% 100.00%  Broad  44.35% 46.98% 
     High End  3.86% 6.84% 
Panel C  Low End  48.81% 38.00% 
Legal Status     
Small 
Business  2.98% 8.18% 
Bank  0.93% 24.14%    Total  100.00% 100.00% 
Credit Unition/Coop  26.33% 2.09%      
NBFI  13.04% 61.27%  Panel F 
NGO  57.62% 1.29%  Scale    
Other  1.30% 1.12%  Large  25.30% 43.40% 
Rural Bank  0.79% 10.10%  Medium  24.59% 24.63% 
  Total  100.00% 100.00%  Small  50.11% 31.98% 











Correlation Matrices with Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions in Panel A and  



















masculinity 0.5193 0.3253 1.0000
uncertainty avoidance -0.4973 -0.4556 -0.2293 1.0000
long term orientation 0.0597 0.2047 -0.3462 -0.4946 1.0000
















business regulatory 0.4271 1.0000
public resource 0.5794 0.3432 1.0000
financial sector 0.3647 0.4089 0.3670 1.0000
property rights 0.5611 0.5727 0.5380 0.5219 1.0000
social protection 0.4894 0.5079 0.5667 0.4099 0.5535 1.0000
transparency accountability 0.4092 0.3482 0.4424 0.5736 0.6607 0.4070 1.0000
